Italy: Berlusconi’s Media Playground?

Even before I ever began researching, writing, and comparing media systems around the world, I was familiar with the name Silvio Berlusconi. I knew him as Italy’s prime minister, and also as the billionaire media mogul. I did not know, however, that he and Rupert Murdoch used to be buddies, but are now rivals, or that Berlusconi is the co-owner of Endemol, the Dutch production company that brought us Big Brother (Osborne, 2007; Israely, 2009). Clearly, it would be futile to try to understand the landscape of Italian television today without Berlusconi.

But how did such degree of media concentration and power come about? I mean, Berlusconi did not just materialize from ether. He, like any other industrialist/politician, is the product of a political, social, and economic environment. At least that would be what author’s Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini would argue. They suggest, in Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics, that political institutions, beliefs, traditions, power-sharing agreements, economic variables, and the evolution of civil society influence the development of the media system. Their thesis, though similar to that espoused in Four Theories of the Press, is not as deterministic or as simple. That is, where Siebert, Peterson, and Schramn, the authors of of Four Theories of the Press, proposed four models — authoritarian, the liberal, the social responsibility, and the Soviet Totalitarian — to explain media behavior, and believed that differences between them were about philosophy,  Hallin and Mancini believe the picture is more complex. There are no ideal types, and the purpose of studying media comparatively should not be limited to pointing out failures. In other words, we should not expect media in different countries to follow a liberal model, which was the ideal for Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm. Instead, we should try to understand the key influences that make them different, and the layers of complexity that make them contradictory:

The Liberal Model enshrined in normative theory, based primarily on the American and to a somewhat lesser extent the British experience, has become so widely diffused around the worlds – partly, as Blanchard (1986) points out, as a result of campaign mounted by the U.S. government and press in the early years of the Cold War — that other conceptions of journalism often are not conceptualized clearly even by their own practitioners. Even within the United States, the normative ideal of the neutral independent watchdog leads to blind spots in journalists’ understanding of what they do [...]. The gap between ideal and reality is far greater in countries such as Italy or Spain where journalists will express allegiance to the Liberal model of neutrality and objectivity, while the actual practice of journalism is deeply rooted in partisan advocacy traditions (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 13-14).

So, what key influences should we look at to try to unravel the Italian media system? According to Hallin and Mancini, we should look at (1) the development of media markets, (2) political parallelism, (3) the development of journalistic professionalism, and (4) degree and nature of state intervention.

Development of Media Markets

For Hallin and Mancini, this category describes when, how, and which types of media develop in a nation. For example, in the United States, newspapers “tend to be addressed to the mass public” (p. 22), whereas in Southern Europe, which includes Italy, they are usually geared to the elites. Some countries, furthermore, have a national media, while others have regional and local media.

Political Parallelism

The media, all claims to the contrary, is never truly impartial, or truly disengaged from political power. Hallin and Mancini explain this relationship through the variable of political parallelism, which they define as “the extent to which the different media reflect distinct political orientations in their news and current affair s reporting, and sometimes also the entertainment content” (p. 28).

Professionalism

This dimension refers to whether or not the media are autonomous. That is, whether or not the individuals that produce content for media organizations can work with relative lack of pressure from, either, owners, or the government. Professionalism also refers to the existence of ethical norms, which, in the case of broadcasting service, include the obligation to serve the public.

State Role

States shape the media system by enacting policies and regulations, by granting subsidies, and by protecting local media production from outside competition, among other tools. States can also intervene through outright ownership of the media, and through funding.

The Model at work in Italy: How did we get to Berlusconi?

Lets see how useful Hallin and Mancini’s model is to explain the Italian situation. First, the media in Italy did not develop as nation-wide markets. They were, and remained for the most part, local and regional in character. Furthermore, the press, and the media by extension, developed with strong party affiliations, with papers like L’Unita (Communist Party), Il Popolo (Christian Democrats), and l’Avanti (Socialists), and l’Ossevatore Romano, which is the official paper of the Catholic Church, and one of the most influential dailies in the country. Hiring practices in all of these outlets reflected ideological commitments. Moreover, fascism exacerbated the political affiliations of the press:

Under Fascism, of course, the media were expected to serve political ends – Mussolini was a journalist. And with the Liberation the first newspaper licenses went to anti-fascist political forces [...]. The party press was extremely important in the immediate post liberation period (Hallin & Mancini, 100).

In terms of political parallelism, the practice of lottizzazione is prevalent, in public broadcasting (RAI) and commercial media (Hibberd, 2007). As in the UK, RAI was established by government charter, and given public service obligations. RAI also held a monopoly over broadcasting, which remained in effect until 1976 (Hibberd, 2004; 2007). The Christian Democratic Party was in control of policy, programming, and operations until 1963, when the Socialists began joining government coalitions, and were given roles in the direction of the institution.  The power sharing arrangement is known as lottizzazione.

Lottizzazione is a distinctive characteristic of the Italian media system, and it speaks to its level of professionalization and independence. It parcels out control over public broadcast media, among other public services, between different political forces. Lottizzazione, according to Padovani, determined not only how the RAI was carved up, but who would be hired to work there:

During the first decades of television broadcasting, journalists’ entry into RAI was determined by political and social homogeneity with the government party. In some cases the broadcaster itself trained its journalists, who were chosen from among young intellectuals, often in line with the dominant ideology of the time. Candidates were selected upon the recommendations of political leaders and friends of the director general and, only on rare occasions, they were selected from among the winners of national exams. Selection procedures, which consisted mostly of interviews, written and oral tests, and professional tests, were often fictitious, while determinant factors were personal and party connection and the “right recommendation (Padovani, 162).

Hibberd (2007) traces the institutionalization of Lottizzazione to around 1975, which was the year in which the Broadcasting Act divided the RAI into two networks:

The formation of two networks facilitated the creation of two broad ideological camps: the first for a Catholic culture and the second for a lay culture, with the result that the two camps were gradually subjected to political control. RAI was effectively partitioned along party lines running from the President (Socialist) and the Director General (Christian Democrat) down to the TV and radio networks, Raiuno (Christian Democrat) and Raidue (Socialist). Radio channels came under the sphere of influence of minor government parties (p. 885).

In terms of the role of the state, it is important to first understand how the state is organized to exercise power. Italy has enjoyed formal democracy since the mid 1800, when electoral laws were first introduced. These laws, however, only extended suffrage to landowners, and literate, male individuals. Universal male suffrage was established in 1913, and universal suffrage came about in 1946, which is when Italy became a Republic. In 1948, Italy adopted parlamentarism as a form of political organization of the government. Under parliamentary systems, voters elect the members of parliament, and they, in turn, elect the President, who holds ceremonial power. The president, in turn, names the Prime Minister, who holds executive power; he/she forms the government, by selecting the members of the Council of Ministers. The system, though modeled after British parlamentarism, has been notably unstable, as there have been at least 60 different governments since 1945 (US State Department, 2009).

As stated previously, RAI held a monopoly over broadcasting until 1976, when the Courts decided to allow commercial broadcasting based on the fact that “technical advances meant that television frequencies were no longer as scarce as they once were and commercial broadcasting could be permitted at a local level” (p. Hibberd, 2006, p. 886). However, the Courts left the system unregulated until the passage of the 1990 Broadcasting Act. The lack of regulation not only allowed for the proliferation of local channels, it also opened the door to Silvio Berlusconi, whose company, Fininvest, “gained gradual control of the commercial television market” (Hibberd, 2007, p. 886). By 1980, Berlusconi had almost achieved national coverage. By 1984, through acquisitions, he was RAI’s only national competitor. Though the Italian courts revoked his license that same year, Socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi reopened them by decree. Since Craxi was a personal friend of Berlusconi’s, the decree —known as the Berlusconi Decree — is an obvious example of political clientelism (Hibberd, 2007).

Who is this guy? And why does he matter

Berlusconi is, without a doubt, one of the most controversial figures in contemporary Italy. He is a media mogul, and according to Forbes, he has more money than Rupert Murdoch (Forbes, 2009). Through his family’s holding company, Fininvest, he has controlling interests over Mediaset, the largest private media company in Italy, the AC Milan, Mondadori publishing, Il Giornale newspaper, and over 100 companies more. Foreign Policy magazine described him, in 2009, as “a master of legal maneuvering” who has managed to avoid jail for corruption, tax evasion, and embezzlement, and has been elected prime minister 3 times in spite of it all. His trials and tribulations involve a sex scandal, a high profile divorce, and ever-recurrent embezzlement allegations. Here is what BusinessWeek has to say about his latest brush with Italian law:

The latest probe, dubbed Mediatrade-Rti, is an offshoot of investigation that led to one of those trials. In that trial, the premier and others are accused of overpaying for rights to show U.S. movies on Berlusconi’s TV networks and pocketing the differences (D’Emilio, 2010).

What a guy, and what a system! Berlusconi, his critics say, exercises and incredible degree of control over Italian broadcasting. Hibberd points out that he has used his position to advance Mediaset’s interests, and to unermine the RAI. Hence, in this sense, “Berlusconis’s conflicts of interest are very real and are detrimental to the economic and cultural development of media in Italy.” However, Hibberd also indicates a measure of pluralism, as the system offers a wide array of media choices (2007). Consequently, he argues that it is too simplistic to blame everything on Berlusconi, or to accuse him of controlling 90% of Italian media. The problems, in fact, pre-date the controversial media mogul, as they may be linked to “the slow development of democratic norms and practices” which include “the lack of effective safeguards guaranteeing essential media freedoms” (Hibberd, 2007, p. 29).

Personally, I believe Berlusconi is a creature of his environment. He has benefited from the institutions, practices, and political arrangements that have plagued Italian politics since the early days of the unification of the peninsula. Since the problems are structural, you cannot expect them to go away by wishing them out, or even by jailing Berlusconi. Political systems and practices do not change overnight, and in Italy’s case, the lack of separation between public and private interests will keep the door open to further encroachment upon the public sphere. The Internet, apparently, is next on the list, as Berlusconi’s government is seeking control “over online video content and force anyone who regularly uploads videos to obtain a license from the Ministry of Communications” (Israely, 2009). The legislation will also require sites like Youtube and Dailymotion, as well as blogs and other online content providers, to screen video uploads for pornography and violence. Fines for non-compliance will range from about $210 to $210,000 should the law pass (Barry, 2010).

It will be interesting to see how this law, which some experts believe is a direct challenge to Google, plays out. Berlusconi’s government argues that they are only attempting to enforce the European Union directive “to set up media rules” (Barry, 2010), yet only the Italians have taken it as far.

Did anyone say China?

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References

• Barry, C. (2010, Jan 22). Berlusconi moves to impose internet regulation: Google fights Italian proposal to vet Internet videos, seen as threat to free expression. ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=9636220
• Osborne, A (2007, May 15). It’s a deal, Berlusconi gets Endemol. The London Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2808976/Its-a-deal-Berlusconi-gets-Endemol.html
• Israely, J. (2009, Feb 18). Berlusconi vs Murdoch: Italy’s Real Reality TV. Time. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1880283,00.html
• Forbes (2009, March 11). The worlds billionaires 2009. http://www.forbes.com/lists/2009/10/billionaires-2009-richest-people_The-Worlds-Billionaires_Rank_3.html
• D’Emilio, F (2010, January 22). Latest probe of Berlusconi completed. BusinessWeek, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9DD20Q01.htm

Filed under: Class notes, Global Media Systems, Berlusconi, class notes, Global Media Links, Italy, media and democracy., MediaSet, RAI

Cynical media: Is Jon Stewart bad for democracy?

What is going on in the United States? Once — and it was not so long ago– idealism was the mark of a worthy politician (at least as far as popular films were concerned). Frank Capra, for example, gave the country iconic images of the ideal senator. Jefferson Smith, the naive country boy, reaches the senate only to discover that his idol, Senator Joseph Paine, and his ilk have betrayed every principle in favor of special interests.

Ah… the good old days! Jefferson Smith could prevail at the end because politicians could come around. They just needed a reminder. Clearly, American society was a lot less jaded and cynical than it is today, or so the story goes. But the United States was neither kinder, nor gentler, nor more naive back in the 1930s. There was considerable turmoil in the United States as the country reeled from the Great Depression. As John O. Hunter explains, throughout the 1930s Americans were concerned about “housing, education, discrimination, and unemployment” (Hunter, 1966, p. 230). Hence, questions like What America should do for the Joads? were very important.

So, why do we think that American society then had less to feel discouraged about, less to gripe about, and less to be cynical about than we do today? The answer, according to Robert Hariman, is loss of innocence:

For the past decade we have had to contend with noxious politics and irresponsible media: A relentless persecution having no possible public benefit, vicious political operatives destroying dedicated men and women with lies and more lies, and an administration using egregious deception and highly coordinated propaganda campaigns to advance policies that are fundamentally damaging to the national interest, human rights, and the democratic process (Hariman, 2007, p. 275).

Under the circumstances we need a laugh. But more importantly, we need Jon Stewart and his brand of political comedy. In American society, parody has always been a vehicle to bring serious issues to the public. In other words, political parody stimulates democracy and public discourse. It raises awareness about society’s problems that would otherwise go unnoticed, especially in light of the overwhelming amount of information that circulates every day. Accordingly, Robert Hariman asks us to see the Daily Show for what it is. Not idle and corrosive cynicism, but “a defense of democratic deliberation” (Hariman, 2007, p. 274).

Roderick Hart and Johanna Hartelius, on the other hand, take the opposite view. They see Jon Stewart’s comedy as cynical, and thus detrimental to American democracy. Using rhetorical devices like diatribes (rants deriding public figures and institutions)  and chreia (“statements about an incident or situation, followed by a pungent remark”), cynics like Stewart offer vacuous, self-indulgent criticism, but no alternatives or solutions.

Here is an example of a rant, by Lewis Black.

And this is an example of chreia:

The Daily Show With Jon Stewart	Mon – Thurs 11p / 10c
Doubt Break ’09
www.thedailyshow.com
Daily Show Full Episodes Political Humor Ron Paul Interview

Hart and Hartelius* write that politics is a serious affair that demands seriousness:

Politics, of course, depends on more than mere attention. It depends on serious beliefs seriously pursued. Cynicism, in contrast, promotes only itself, summoning followers to abandon conventional society and its stultifying love of order, predictability, and progress (Hart & Hartelius, 2007, p. 267).

Nevertheless, cynicism is very popular. It is a mode of address that fits the generations of Americans of the television age. Television creates spectacles, superficial heroes, vapid pseudo-events (see Boorstin, “The Image”), and celebrities that fill our time, our screens, and that seep into our conversations. Jon Stewart can aptly play to us, as an audience because we are “quickly bored and often surly” and have little patience for “intractable problems” (Hart & Hartelius, 2007, p. 270). In other words, those of us who have always had television available want instant gratification. We want neat, uncomplicated endings, and we want to escape into lala-lands where we don’t have to reflect on the seriousness of real life.

Ironically, The Daily Show has a life of its own. We know that it is satire, but since it offers commentary about real events, it is taken seriously. In 2004, when Jon Stewart appeared on CNN’s Crossfire, co-host Tucker Carlson accused him of not asking poignant questions. To this, Stewart responded: “if your goal is to compare yourself to a comedy show you’re more than welcome.”

Tucker Carlson is not alone. Bill O’Reilly also felt the need to set the record straight. His concern? that young people in America, who make up the Daily Show’s key demographic, may believe Jon Stewart is painting an accurate picture of the country

And this is how CNN covered “the feud”

Perhaps O’Reilly is not off the mark: Did you know that, according to Time magazine, Jon Stewart is America’s most trusted newscaster? I was surprised, but only because I never did consider him a newscaster. I consider him a satirist and a political commentator. But, in terms of serving one of the key function of a free press, the Daily Show has become the watchdog of the watchdogs. Here is a good example of what this means:

The Daily Show With Jon Stewart	Mon – Thurs 11p / 10c
Queer and Loathing in D.C.
www.thedailyshow.com
Daily Show Full Episodes Political Humor Ron Paul Interview

References:

• Hariman, R. (2007). In defense of Jon Stewart. Critical Studies in Media Communication. 24(3), pp. 273-277
• Hart, R.P & Hartelius, J.E. (2007). The political sins of Jon Stewart. Critical Studies in Media Communication. 24(3), pp 263-272.
• Hunter, J.O. (1966). Marc Blitzstein’s “The Cradle will Rock” as a Document of America, 1937. American Quarterly. 18(2). 277- 233.

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Notes:

* The issue of Critical Studies in Media Communication in which Hart & Hartelius, and Hariman were published recounts the mock trial of Jon Stewart, during the Annual Convention of the National Communication Association. Their comments are meant to be taken with a grain of salt.

Filed under: Class notes, Courses, Popular Culture in America, class notes, Daily Show, Jon Stewart, media, media and democracy., politics, satire

Women in American popular culture

Popular culture may seem all vapid and superficial, but it is undeniable that the most significant ideological battles of the Twentieth Century seep into popular forms of entertainment. Civil Rights spawned very special episodes on Little House on the Prairie, and Women’s Liberation opened the door to Mary Tyler Moore. The problem is, though, that when popular culture reflects upon contemporary social issues, the schizophrenia often ensues. Conflicting value systems and interests make for representations of daily life that have little resemblance to actual daily life. This is the main point of Susan Douglas’ book, Where the Girls Are.

Chapter Two of Douglas’ book (Mama Said) deals with images of motherhood in popular culture. Douglas states that these images are far removed from reality, and that they cause frustrations upon those who consume them. In other words, they imposed impossible ideals upon real women. They were expected to be perfect housekeepers:

No wonder so many of our mothers were pissed. They worked all the time with little or no acknowledgement, while their ingrate kids watched TV shows that insisted that good mothers, like true princesses, never complained, smiled a real lot, were constantly good-natured, and never expected anything from anyone. when our mothers sat back to relax in front of the TV after twelve- to fifteen-hour day, they were surrounded by allegories about masculine heroism and the sanctity of male gonads. Rarely, if ever, did they see any suggestion that the incessant, mundane, and often painful contortions of a woman’s daily life might, in fact, be heroic too (Douglas, 1995, p. ).

Television in the 1950s limited women’s role to the domestic sphere; women were expected to keep an immaculate house, while the men went out into the real world to earn a paycheck. In American culture, this idea was expressed as the separate spheres ideology. According to it, men and women were biologically, morally and spiritually different, and these differences were ordained by god. Men were aggressive, rational, independent, and strong, whereas women were passive, irrational, submissive, nurturing and weak. Because of their natural characteristics, men and women were destined to function in separate spheres of influence; the men would rule the public sphere, and the women would reign over the domestic sphere (Lavender, 1998).

Catherine Beecher was an influential, albeit contradictory, advocate of the separate spheres ideology. Beecher, who was a member of a prominent New England family, believed that women should be educated, but only because of their role as mothers, caretakers, and educators. Catherine thought, therefore, that the most significant contribution that a woman could make to the democratic process was bringing up the men to be upstanding citizens:

The success of democratic institutions, as is conceded by all, depends upon the intellectual and moral character of the mass of people. If they are intelligent and virtuous, democracy is a blessing; but if they are ignorant and wicked, it is only a curse, and as much more dreadful than any other form of civil government, as a thousand tyrants are more to be dreaded than one. It is equally conceded that the formation of the moral and intellectual character of the young is committed mainly to the female hand. The mother forms the character of the future man; the sister bends the fibres that are to be hereafter the forest tree; the wife sways the heart, whose energies may turn for good or for evil the destinies of the nation. Let the women of this country be virtuous and intelligent, and the men will certainly be the same. The proper education of a man decides the welfare of an individual; but educate a woman, and the interests of a whole family are secured (Beecher, 1849, 36-37)

The separate spheres argument is a patriarchal one. Patriarchy is a belief system that sustains that men are superior to women, and are thus entitled to privileges that women should not aspire to, or enjoy. In patriarchal systems there is a clear distinction between roles and spheres, with men dominating the public sphere, and women restricted to the domestic one.

In the 1960s, Betty Friedan would re-introduced the separate spheres argument; however, she would call it  the feminine mystique, and would argue that it kept women from reaching their full potential:

The feminine mystique says that the highest value and only commitment for women is the fulfillment of their own femininity. It says that the great mistake of Western culture, through most of its history, has been the undervaluation of this femininity. It says this femininity is so mysterious and intuitive and close to the creation and origin of life that man-made science may never be able to understand it. But however special and different, it is in no way inferior to the nature of man; it may even in certain respects be superior. The mistake, says the mystique, the root of women’s troubles in the past is that women envied men, women tried to be like men, instead of accepting their own nature, which can find fulfillment only in sexual passivity, male domination, and nurturing maternal love (Friedan, 1963, p. 43).

According to Douglas, the feminine mystique ideology did not take hold of American society until the late 1950s. However, once it did, the feminine mystique confronted American women with conflicting expectations. On the one hand, they were expected to be consumers, but were depicted as irrational, childlike, and incapable of logical judgment. On the other hand, they were also expected to reign supreme in the domestic sphere, even though the domestic economy often requires both parents to work outside the home.

For Empey, the problem with motherhood is about incompatible institutions. The public sphere, that of government, schools, and the economy, place impossible demands upon the domestic sphere, and thus individuals can participate fully in one, but not both:

When institutions are coordinated individuals can participate in the activities of one institution without being prevented from participating in the activities of other institutions. When individuals cannot participate in more than one institution, we have good reason to think that something has gone wrong – that our institutions aren’t allowing us the freedom they should (Empey, 69).

But, how much freedom do our institutions really allow for? According to French theorist Louis Althusser, institutions serve the interests of a ruling class, and no ruling class can “hold state power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses.” (2006, p. 81). These Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA) include churches, educational systems, families, trade unions, and the media. ISAs “function primarily through ideology,” not repression, that is individuals are not coerced to accept a belief system; they are, in fact, free to choose what they believe in. They do not, however, have equal influence over which ideas become mainstream, or how they are presented. Furthermore, ISAs actively discourage dissent because they instill expectations about behavior, rituals, and practices that signal acceptance.

When we think of popular culture in ideological terms, we must ask: which ideology/ideologies are being captured and reproduced through its manifestations? In the case of the representation of women, especially that described by Douglas, patriarchy is clearly evident. However, Douglas also states that not every woman bought into the patriarchal argument, which indicates that ideologies may be pervasive, but they are, by no means uncontested or unchangeable.

Questions:

• What is the image of motherhood depicted in contemporary TV? (please provide examples). How does it compare with the image of television mothers of the 1950s, like Donna Reed or June Cleaver?
• Can we think of all forms of popular culture in terms of ideology? Why/why not?
• What are the advantages and/or disadvantages of using ideology as a concept to analyze popular culture?

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References

• Beecher, C. (1849). A treatise on domestic economy, for the use of young ladies at home and at school. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers.
• Douglas, S. (1995). Mama said. In S. Douglas Where the Girls Are: Growing up Female with the Mass Media. New York: Times Books.
• Friedan, B. (1963). The feminine mystique. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
• Lavender, C. (1998). The Cult of Domesticity and True Womanhood. Accessed on 9/29/09 from http://www.library.csi.cuny.edu/dept/history/lavender/386/truewoman.html
• Empey, S. (). Lois: Portrait of a Mother

Filed under: Class notes, Courses, Popular Culture in America, Uncategorized, class notes, Courses, Donna Reed, femininity, motherhood, Roseanne, TV mothers., women in American popular culture

How popular things become popular?

When I was a lot younger, I thought that likability determined whether something became popular or not. Take The Beatles, for example; they were popular because “everyone” liked them (according to my mother). The same could be said of Elvis (according, again, to my mother), hula hoops (according to the Coen brothers), and Like a Virgin (according to me, when I was 14). Of course, this meant that if you did not like any of those things, you were hopelessly out of touch. Perhaps you were  too old, too weird, too un-coordinated, or just un-cool; either way, something was wrong with you, because millions of fans cannot be wrong.

Popularity baffles me. Mind you, I tend to agree with Chuck Klosterman when he says “don’t get pissed off over the fact that the way you feel about culture isn’t some kind of universal consensus.” (Klosterman, 2004). Klosterman, however, stops short. He simply reminds us that “culture can’t be wrong, because culture just IS,” but he doesn’t wonder HOW it becomes what it IS. So, even if my instincts back then, when I was a teenager, were right, likability does not explain how an artist, a fad, a song, or a gadget get to have millions of fans? Where does it all start?

One explanation is the discovery story. It goes something like this:

A talented group of musicians form a band. They rehearse constantly, write wonderful songs, but must also hold menial jobs to pay the rent. At night, they play at very seedy joints, in hopes of being noticed. One night, out of the blue, a record producer (or a talent scout) catches their act. He signs them, puts them in a study, and has them lay down the tracks that will become (insert name of album here). Their first single hits the top ten, and it’s all uphill from there (at least until egos, drug overdoses, or Y0ko Ono get in the way).

Does this story sound familiar? with small variations you can apply it to musicians that range from Johnny Cash to Madonna. And it may even be true, but it is also very simplistic; it assumes that all anyone needs to be “discovered” is talent, hard work, and luck.  As Barthes would put it, such a story is a myth, and it “obscures history” (but I’ll get to that in another post). For now, I’ll limit myself to reviewing three explanations of how the popular becomes popular.

The political economy perspective

For communications and media scholars, “political economy” is a term generally used to describe scholarship concerned with the relationships among economic, political, and communications systems within the structure of global capitalism” (Bettig, 2002). Political economy is highly influenced by Marx’s views about capitalism, that is, by the idea of how the capitalist economy works. Under capitalism few individuals and/or corporations control the means of production. This control allows them to shape society and exercise dominance. Through conglomeration and monopoly, capitalists maximize profits at the expense of quality. They can also influence prices, wages, supply and demand, which is guaranteed by the lack of competitive alternatives.

In terms of the media, political economists argue that they are also controlled by capital. Consolidation shuts down  alternative viewpoints, and as a result, the media can be used to influence public opinion,  to suppress dissent, and to “manufacture consent” (see Chomsky).

In Malcolm Gladwell’s article “The Coolhunt” we catch a glimpse of what political economists believe about popular culture: it is a commodity. Commodities are manufactured by large conglomerates, and their success in the market depends on advertising. Popularity, hence, is not a fluke; it is the result deliberate actions that call attention to the commodity and make it desirable. Here’s an example from the Mac vs PC (or PC vs Mac… thanks to Sam Szabo, for pointing that out).

The role of advertising is to persuade us. But there is no guarantee that ALL OF US will head to the apple store just because we watched an ad. In fact, according to Dallas Smythe, that isn’t really the point of advertising at all.  Since we live in an industrialized society, we will go out and buy things anyway. Advertising merely shows us how to evaluate different products. Here are two examples to illustrate this:

Political economy also tackles the question of mass appeal. Mass appeal presupposes that there is ONE mass audience, and that what this audience wants determines what becomes popular. Accordingly, Reality TV is popular because people watch it. However, Eileen Meehan (and also Smythe) suggested that this isn’t the case. The ratings, says Meehan, determine which shows are put on the schedule. In the United States, Nielsen is the company that issues the television ratings, and they are based on sampling procedures that do not count everyone equally.

Why not? To put it simply it is because television networks in the business of selling audiences to advertisers, and advertisers want bona fide consumers (Smythe). A bona fide consumer is someone who has disposable income to purchase brand name items. Meehan adds that this  excludes entire segments of the population from “the audience,” which ends up being middle class, white, suburban, and male.

Meehan and Smythe provide some persuasive arguments that explain how television operated when there were only 3 networks. However, we now live in a multi-channel society, and it is neither feasible nor realistic to talk about ONE AUDIENCE when we have so much segmentation. Hence, can bona fide consumers can be of any color of the rainbow, gender, ethnicity, or political persuasion?

Absolutely, but one key insight still holds: they need to be able to consume. If they can’t, or won’t, they’re of less value to advertisers.

Diffusion of Innovations

Diffusion of innovations (DOI) offers another explanation for the popularity of things (and I’m using the term very broadly to include shows, ideas, trends, fashions, etc). Gladwell (1997) suggests that understanding DOI can explain “how trends work.” According to Rogers (1995, p. 5):

“Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system.It is a special type of communication, in that the messages are concerned with new ideas.”

DOI recognizes that every new idea comes with a degree of uncertainty. This means that not everyone will jump on the bandwagon at the same time. Here is how Gladwell summarizes it:

In the language of diffusion research, the handful of farmers who started trying hybrid seed corn at the very beginning of the thirties were the “innovators,” the adventurous ones. The slightly larger group that followed them was the “early adopters.” They were the opinion leaders in the community, the respected, thoughtful people who watched and analyzed what those wild innovators were doing and then did it themselves. Then came the big bulge of farmers in 1936, 1937, and 1938 – the “early majority” and the “late majority,” which is to say the deliberate and the skeptical masses, who would never try anything until the most respected farmers had tried it. Only after they had been converted did the “laggards,” the most traditional of all, follow suit.

Gladwell also notes the importance of interpersonal communication for the DOI process. Accordingly, a great majority will adopt a new idea based on examples and opinions of those who adopted it first.

Going viral

Political economy and DOI are very useful when we consider how commodities, new ideas and trends become popular. In political economy, popularity is linked to market value. In DOI, on the other hand, the adoption an innovation depends, among other things, on how well it will satisfy (or create) needs (Rogers, 1995). But, what about those viral videos? How do you assign monetary value to the Dramatic Chipmunk? What need does it fulfill?

For Johnson (2007), memes can offer an explanation for the dramatic chipmunk. Richard Dawkins coined the term. In his book The Selfish Gene, Dawkins argued that cultural change can be explained through evolutionary theory. Memes are similar to genes; they are “replicators” (Dawkins, 1976/1989, p. 192). Genes contain information that preserve and replicate those traits that can ensure the survival of the fittest. Memes, on the other hand,  allow trends to thrive through imitation:

Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catchphrases, clothes, fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperm or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation. If a scientist hears, or reads about, a good idea, he passes it on to his colleagues and students. He mentions it in his articles and his lectures. If the idea catches on, it can be said  to propagate itself, spreading from brain to brain [...]. When you plant a fertile meme in my mind you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for the meme’s propagation (Dawkins, 1976/1989, p. 192).

Like genes, furthermore, memes are also highly competitive. According to Johnson (2007), a successful meme is one that captures our attention. However, memes are very superficial; they’re ephemeral, which is why we’re not stuck with the dramatic chipmunk for years and years. We will inevitably move on as soon as new meme catches our attention.

The interesting thing about memes in popular culture is that they can, and are, being monetized. According to Bonnie Ruberg, from PC World magazine, internet memes are opening up new possibilities for businesses. Some examples include Cute Overload, StuffWhitePeopleLike.com, and ICanHasCheezburger.com.

So, why do popular things become popular?

Last year, I was one of the millions to post 25 things about me on my facebook account. I did it after I was tagged. Three days later, Katie Lee was talking about it with Hoda on the Today Show. Time magazine did a story on it, and so did every major news organization. Did news coverage helps spread the 25 random things? or did it respond to it?

The reason I ask these questions is so we can think about more complex explanations for popularity. Business imperatives do matter, to some degree, but DOI and memes also figure into the equation. So here is what I think: We should acknowledge that trends emerge from multiple sources; they can come from the top, or from the crowd. Furthermore, in our increasingly networked society, popularity  rests largely on the ability to spread through social networks, which means that our media use and our habits matter. Finally, businesses, media, and institutions can and will pick up on trends, and spread them even more (and this is what happened with Obama Girl).

In other words, it’s not productive to settle on a single explanation. We should, instead, consider popularity as a complex phenomenon through which ideas, trends, and fads spread through society.

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References

• Bettig, R (2002). Political economy. In Encyclopedia of Communication and Information. (Vol 2, p. 711-713). New York: Macmillan Reference.
• Dawkins, R. (1989). The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Gladwell, M. (1997, March 17). The coolhunt. The New Yorker.
• Johnson, D (2007). Mapping the meme: A geographical approach to materialist rhetorical criticism. Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies. 4(1), pp. 27-50
• Klosterman, C. (2004, December 31). Culture got you down? Esquire. Retrieved July 20, 2007 from http://www.esquire.com/features/chuck-klostermans-america/ESQ0105-JAN_AMERICA_rev
• Ruberg, B. (2009, August). Cash in on the internet memes phenomenon. PC World. 27(8), p. 33-34.
• Meehan, E.R. (2006). Gendering the commodity audience: Critical media research, feminism, and political economy. In M.G. Durham and D.M. Kellner, (Eds.), Media and cultural studies Key Works. [Revised edition], pp. 230 – 257.  Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
• Rogers, E. (2005). Diffusion of Innovations. New York: Free Press
• Smythe, D. (2006). On the audience commodity and its work. In M.G. Durham and D.M. Kellner, (Eds.), Media and cultural studies Key Works. [Revised edition], pp. 230 – 256.  Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Filed under: Class notes, Popular Culture in America, class notes, Courses, Diffusion of Innovations., Malcolm Gladwell, memes

What is popular culture?

I found this video through Danielle Stern, who linked it from amplifyme (formerly Project Think Different). She’s right; it is a good place to start our conversations about pop culture. Just like the video does, we need to define what we mean when we use terms like culture, popular culture, and popular.

Here are some definitions of culture:

• Matthew Arnold: “Culture is a study of perfection” (Arnold, 1869, p. 8). and “the great men of culture are those who have had a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society to the other, the knowledge, the best ideas of their time” (p. 49)
• Edward Tylor: “Culture, or civilization … is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Tylor 1871, p. 1)
• Dwight Macdonald: culture [better yet high culture] “is chronicled in the textbooks” (1962, p. 3).
• Wikipedia: Of course they have an entry on it, but it is too long to excerpt. However, among one of the common usages of the word is to equate culture with “excellence of taste in the fine arts and humanities, also known as high culture.” If you notice, this is exactly how Macdonald uses the term culture

Dwight Macdonald‘s arguments:

• There are differences between high culture and popular culture (which he calls masscult). (1) Masscult is mass produced, whereas “Culture” is produced by individuals; (2) masscult is commercial, repetitive, and unoriginal, whereas “culture” is unique, creative, and original; (3) masscult appeals to the masses (and they don’t know what’s culture anyway), whereas “culture” appeals to the higher intellects and sensitivities; (4) masscult is devoid of any standards; yet culture has standards; (5) masscult dehumanizes you, and teaches nothing; but culture elevates your spirits, and makes you a better person.

But who makes those decisions about “taste”, “originality”, or “value.” ? Who, in other words, empowered Matthew Arnold, or Dwigth Macdonald as the arbiters of culture? This is not a simple question, and it is not an idle question. Furthermore, as with the definitions of culture, it has multiple answers. For example, Marx and Engels would tell you that these matters are settled by “the ruling class” (because at all points of history, the ideals of the ruling class are the ruling ideals.” Control of the means of production and distribution give the ruling class (whoever they are) dominance. Althusser, much in the same vein, would add that it’s all about the control of the Ideological State Apparatuses (like institutions, schools, religion), through which ideas are disseminated. And Bourdieu, similarly, would point out that there is absolutely nothing natural about taste: it is something we learn, and it is socially-constructed.

Here are some structures in our society that support distinctions between high culture and popular culture:

• The Academy of Motion Pictures, Arts and Sciences. They give out the Oscars and some of the nominated films not box office hits. Hence, they’re judged based on standards of quality that separate them from other films.
• Schools: I’m not very familiar with the American school system, but in Nicaragua we study art, we don’t study pop art. Art is serious business.
• Art galleries and museums, though the lines are sometimes sketchy. Still, an established community makes the argument that Andy Warhol’s “Campbell Soup Cans” are art.

Who decides what will be popular?

Jacques Barzun doubts the existence of a popular culture because the people are not involved in its production. It’s all mass-produced. Hence, can it really reflect a society’s “life and soul” (2001, p. 3)? In Barzun, we find the concern with authenticity, which is also echoed by those who wonder about the values that are transmitted through popular culture. Does gangsta rap represent an authentic African American experience? Does reggeaton represent the Nuyorican community? Shouldn’t we be saying: enough already? Give us “our” culture (or whatever) back?

Not according to Chuck Klosterman. Here’s a quote from his essay:

If you feel betrayed by culture, it’s not because you’re right and the universe is wrong; it’s only because you’re not like most other people. But this should make you happy, because — in all — likelihood — you hate those other people anyway. You are being betrayed by a culture that has no relationship to who you are or how you live.

Now, this does not really answer the question of who decides what will become popular. According to Macdonald, it’s an evil  cabala of the “Lords of Masscult,” and Barzun states that it is the industries (media industries, that is). Klosterman doesn’t address this question at all, but it’s clear that he doesn’t think it’s you or I.

But more on that later… when we read Malcolm Gladwell, we’ll revisit this point.

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References:

• Arnold. M. (1869). Culture and anarchy: An essay in political and social criticism. London: Smith, Elder & Co.
• Barzun, J. (2002). The tenth muse. In S.J. Gould & R. Atwan (Eds.). Best American Essays. pp. 1-12. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
• Klosterman, C. (2004, December 31). Culture got you down? Esquire. Retrieved July 20, 2007 from http://www.esquire.com/features/chuck-klostermans-america/ESQ0105-JAN_AMERICA_rev
• Macdonald, D. (1962). Masscult and Midcult. Against the American grain. New York: Random House.

Filed under: Class notes, Popular Culture in America, class notes, Dwight Macdonald., Pop Culture, pop culture vs high culture